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MURPHY V. NCAA: THE SUPREME COURT’S 
LATEST ADVANCE IN CHEMERINSKY’S 
“FEDERALISM REVOLUTION” 
Jonathan O. Ballard Jr.* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Federalism jurisprudence exists on a spectrum. As the ideological 
preferences of the Supreme Court have shifted with the composition 
of the bench, so too has the Court’s position on federalism shifted 
between competing schools of thought. On one side of the spectrum is 
the centralist tradition, advocating for a broad interpretation of the 
federal government’s constitutional powers. On the other side is the 
federalist tradition, preaching the virtues of state autonomy, ever-wary 
of the federal government’s tyrannical potential. 
The debate over federalism is undeniably political. Since the Civil 
War, the tension between federal supremacy and state autonomy has 
played a major role in the country’s most divisive political contests.1 
Many of these contests were decided in landmark Supreme Court 
decisions that now define the role of federalism in our government.2 
From 1937 to 1995, these decisions defined an era of Supreme 
Court centralism.3 During this era, the Warren Court famously 
augmented the federal government’s constitutional powers, allowing 
progressives to effect social change in the form of fortified civil and 
voting rights.4 Frustrated by the Court’s liberal tendencies, 
conservatives began to campaign against this progression in the 1980s, 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.M., Instrumental 
Performance, Chapman University. I wish to thank the editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review for their insightful suggestions. Most importantly, I would like to thank my mother, 
Elizabeth, my father, Jon, and my grandmother, Marilyn, without whom my academic 
accomplishments would not have been possible. This article is dedicated to them. 
 1. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7, 7 (2001). 
 2. Robert K. Christensen & Charles R. Wise, Dead or Alive? The Federalism Revolution and 
Its Meaning for Public Administration, 69 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 920, 920 (2009). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Owen M. Fiss, A Life Lived Twice, 100 YALE L.J. 1117, 1117–21 (1991); Pamela S. 
Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4–7 (2012). 
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advocating for a significant reduction in the federal government’s 
power.5 
In the early 1990s, the Warren Court’s progressive reign came to 
an end. Following the rise of Reagan-era neoconservatism in the 
1980s, the Court, led by Republican appointees, began to revert back 
to a federalist ideology in a movement Erwin Chemerinsky adeptly 
titled the “Federalism Revolution.”6 
During this time, the Court reinvigorated the Tenth Amendment 
to substantially curtail the federal government’s power. The practice 
continues to this day. In Murphy v. NCAA,7 the Court’s application of 
the anticommandeering doctrine, in concert with its divergent 
severability analysis, serves to further undermine the federal 
government’s power and marks a major victory for federalists at large. 
II.  THE HISTORY OF THE ANTICOMMANDEERING DOCTRINE 
The Tenth Amendment limits Congress’s powers to those 
enumerated in the Constitution. Missing from these powers is the 
power to “issue direct orders to the governments of the States.”8 The 
anticommandeering doctrine is a species of Tenth Amendment 
common law that embodies this principle, preventing Congress from 
compelling states or state officials to enforce federal law. 
The doctrine was conceived in New York v. United States,9 in 
which the Supreme Court held that Congress could not, by way of 
federal statute, require the New York state government to provide for 
disposal of radioactive waste created within its borders.10 The Court 
held that this “take title” provision “would ‘commandeer’ state 
governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes, and 
would, for this reason be inconsistent with the Constitution’s division 
of authority between federal and state governments.”11 
 
 5. Inaugural Address, 1981 PUB. PAPERS 1, 2 (Jan. 20, 1981) (“It is my intention to curb the 
size and influence of the Federal establishment and to demand recognition of the distinction 
between the powers granted to the Federal Government and those reserved to the States or to the 
people. All of us need to be reminded that the Federal Government did not create the States; the 
States created the Federal Government.”). 
 6. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 7. 
 7. 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
 8. Id. at 1476. 
 9. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 10. Id. at 175–76. 
 11. Id. at 175. 
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Five years later, the Court elaborated on the doctrine in Printz v. 
United States.12 In Printz, the Court “struck down the provisions of 
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act . . . that required state 
and local law enforcement officials to conduct background checks of 
prospective handgun buyers.”13 In accordance with New York v. 
United States, the Court held that Congress “may neither issue 
directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor 
command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, 
to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”14 Under New 
York v. United States and Printz, federal laws are considered 
unconstitutional if: 1) the law “commandeers” state officials to 
enforce federal law; and 2) the commandeered officials exercise 
legislative or executive functions. 
III.  THE QUESTIONABLE COGENCY OF THE ANTICOMMANDEERING 
DOCTRINE 
Although it has become a mainstay of modern constitutional law, 
the anticommandeering doctrine has been subject to extensive 
criticism.15 Chief among critics’ objections to the doctrine is that it has 
no constitutional basis. Indeed, as the late Justice Scalia admitted 
when writing for the Printz majority, “there is no constitutional text 
speaking to the precise question whether congressional action 
compelling state officers to execute federal laws is unconstitutional.”16 
Having found the basis for the anticommandeering doctrine in 
contentious characterizations of the framers’ legislative intent,17 the 
 
 12. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 13. Adam B. Cox, Expressivism in Federalism: A New Defense of the Anti-Commandeering 
Rule?, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1309, 1309–10 (2000) (footnote omitted). 
 14. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. 
 15. See, e.g., Andrew B. Coan, Commandeering, Coercion, and the Deep Structure of 
American Federalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2015) (contending that the Court’s “explanation of 
and justification for” the anticommandeering doctrine as expressed in New York v. United States 
and Printz “can neither explain nor justify the Court’s commandeering . . . decisions”); Steven 
Schwinn, Symposium: It’s Time to Abandon Anti-commandeering (but Don’t Count on This 
Supreme Court to Do It), SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 17, 2017, 10:44 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-time-abandon-anti-commandeering-dont-count-
supreme-court/ (“[T]his rule, which says that the federal government can’t require states or state 
officials to adopt or enforce federal law, has no basis in the text or history of the document. It has 
only weak support in precedent. And it’s unworkable.”). 
 16. Printz, 521 U.S. at 905. 
 17. See Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 
1104, 1176 (2013) (“From the Founding generation’s perspective  . . . the Constitution does not 
categorically prevent the federal government from commandeering state executive and judicial 
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doctrine’s creators have been accused of hypocrisy; having railed 
against similar specific intent originalism in prior cases.18 This 
inexplicable hypocrisy, coupled with the doctrine’s lack of textual 
support, appear more like the makings of a doctrinalized, ideological 
bias rather than those of a legitimate species of constitutional 
interpretation. 
Dubious though it may be, the anticommendeering doctrine 
persists. On May 14, 2018, the Court redeployed the doctrine in 
Murphy v. NCAA. 
IV.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Congress passed the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection 
Act (PASPA) in 1992, which made it illegal for states that did not 
already permit sports gambling to pass laws legalizing it.19 Congress 
considered the encroaching threat of widespread sports gambling a 
“national problem” and enacted PASPA to prohibit states from 
encouraging the practice.20 Congress worried that state-sanctioned 
sports gambling would otherwise help the practice grow in popularity, 
as it would stamp the practice with a “label of legitimacy.”21 
Subsection 3702(1) of PASPA (“subsection (1)”) applied to state-
sponsored gambling, making it unlawful for “a governmental entity to 
sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize” sports 
gambling “by law or compact.”22 Subsection 3702(2) (“subsection 
(2)”) applied to private actors, making it unlawful for “a person to 
 
officers. The Founders simply didn’t think that commandeering always violates federalism 
principles. In fact, many thought just the opposite.”). 
 18. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 417 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that reliance on legislative intent “poison[s] the well of future legislation, depriving legislators of 
the assurance that ordinary terms, used in an ordinary context, will be given a predictable 
meaning”); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 325 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (arguing that inquiries into legislative intent allows jurists to cherry-pick 
evidentiary fragments that suit their own “predelictions [sic]”). 
 19. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1470 (2018); Lydia Wheeler, Court Rules Against 
New Jersey’s Sports Betting Law, HILL (Aug. 25, 2015, 2:22 PM), 
https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/251913-court-rules-against-nj-in-sports-gambling-
case. 
 20. NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 216 (3d Cir. 2013) aff’g NCAA v. 
Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551 (D.N.J. 2013). 
 21. Id. at 237. 
 22. 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1) (2012), invalidated by Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1481. 
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sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote” sports gambling “pursuant to 
the law or compact of a governmental entity.”23 
Despite PASPA’s enactment, the New Jersey legislature passed a 
law in 2012 that enabled itself to legalize sports gambling.24 New 
Jersey hoped legal sports gambling would rejuvenate Atlantic City’s 
failing casinos.25 
In NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey,26 the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals struck the 2012 law down, finding PASPA to be 
preemptive.27 Undeterred by their defeat in court, New Jersey 
promptly devised an alternative legal scheme. 
In 2014, New Jersey “enacted legislation repealing the 2012 law 
and other provisions of state law related to gaming” that barred sports 
wagering in certain contexts.28 New Jersey believed that by 
eliminating the aspects of the 2012 law that directly authorized sports 
gambling and by repealing New Jersey’s existing anti-gambling laws, 
it had effectively legalized certain forms of the practice.29 
That same year, the five major American sports leagues sought 
an injunction against New Jersey, alleging that the new law violated 
PASPA.30 In its defense, New Jersey argued that “PASPA 
unconstitutionally infringed the State’s sovereign authority to end its 
sports gambling ban.”31 
A.  Procedural History 
Following the Third Circuit’s prior constitutional analysis of 
PASPA in Christie and its own analysis of preemption doctrine, the 
New Jersey District Court ruled that PASPA preempted the 2014 
law.32 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.33 
 
 23. 28 U.S.C. § 3702(2) (2012), invalidated by Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484–85. 
 24. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7; NCAA v. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 491 (D.N.J. 2014). 
 25. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1469; Wheeler, supra note 19. 
 26. 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 27. Id. at 235. 
 28. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 491. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1471. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 503–04. 
 33. NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey, 799 F.3d 259, 268 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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New Jersey filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, invoking the 
anticommandeering doctrine to call PASPA’s constitutionality 
directly into question.34 The Supreme Court granted the petition.35 
B.  The Supreme Court Opinion 
In an opinion penned by Justice Alito, the Court reversed the 
Third Circuit’s decision and struck down PASPA for being 
unconstitutional.36 The opinion began by interpreting the meaning of 
PASPA’s operative text.37 
New Jersey argued that the word “authorize” in subsection (1) 
was equivalent to the word “permit,” and that “any state law that ha[d] 
the effect of permitting sports gambling, including a law totally or 
partially repealing a prior prohibition,” thus authorized the practice.38 
The NCAA interpreted the word more narrowly, arguing that “the 
primary definition of ‘authorize’ requires affirmative action.”39 The 
NCAA contended PASPA thus “empower[ed] a defined group of 
entities . . . with the authority to conduct sports gambling 
operations.”40 
The Court adopted New Jersey’s definition, holding that “[w]hen 
a State completely or partially repeals old laws banning sports 
gambling, it ‘authorize[s]’ that activity.”41 Having interpreted 
PASPA’s text, the Court then delved into its anticommandeering 
doctrine analysis.42 
The Court found that subsection (1) conflicted with the 
anticommandeering doctrine because it “unequivocally dictate[d] 
what a state legislature may and may not do.”43 Perhaps 
melodramatically, the Court suggested, under subsection (1), “[i]t 
[was] as if federal officers were installed in state legislative chambers 
and were armed with the authority to stop legislators from voting on 
 
 34. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1473. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 1478. 
 37. Id. at 1472–73. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. (citing Brief for Respondents at 39, Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) (No. 
16-476-77), 2017 WL 4684747 at *39). 
 40. Id. at 1473. 
 41. Id. at 1474 (alteration in original). 
 42. Id. at 1474–75. 
 43. Id. at 1478. 
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any offending proposals. A more direct affront to state sovereignty,” 
the Court opined, was “not easy to imagine.”44 
Next, the Court rejected the NCAA’s preemption argument.45 
Preemption, the Court explained, “is based on a federal law that 
regulates the conduct of private actors,” and in the case of subsection 
(1), “there [was] simply no way to understand the provision 
prohibiting state authorization as anything other than a direct 
command to the States.”46 This type of prohibition, the Court 
reiterated, “is exactly what the anticommandeering rule does not 
allow.”47 
V.  THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE MURPHY 
ANTICOMMANDEERING RULE 
In many ways, Murphy’s impact on the future of sports betting is 
less than profound. PASPA only prevented state legislatures from 
repealing existing anti-gambling laws, so its invalidation had no 
immediate effect on the legality of the practice in any state except New 
Jersey. As of August 21, 2018, only six states have affirmatively 
legalized sports betting and only fourteen others have considered 
taking similar action.48 There is also little doubt that Congress could 
directly preempt state sports gambling laws in the future if it chooses 
to do so.49 Murphy is more significant in that it facilitates a potentially 
greater divide between politically-divisive state and federal laws. 
A.  Marijuana 
One of the most immediately identifiable consequences of 
Murphy is that states now have greater latitude to legalize marijuana 
under state law.50 Until Murphy, it was uncertain whether federal law, 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 1481. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Phil Helsel, Sports Betting Is Now Legal in Several States. Many Others Are Watching 
from the Sidelines., NBC NEWS (Aug. 13, 2018, 2:13 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/sports-betting-now-legal-several-states-many-others-are-watching-n894211. 
 49. Michael C. Dorf, The Political Stakes of Commandeering in Murphy v. NCAA, DORF L. 
(May 16, 2018, 12:01 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2018/05/the-political-stakes-of-
commandeering.html. 
 50. Robert A. Mikos, The Implications of Murphy v. NCAA for State Marijuana Reforms, 
VAND. U.L. SCH.: MARIJUANA L., POL’Y, & AUTHORITY (May 17, 2018), 
https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/2018/05/the-implications-of-murphy-v-ncaa-for-state-
marijuana-reforms/. 
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which unequivocally prohibits marijuana use, preempted any state 
government’s legalization efforts.51 State courts, state governments, 
and notable commentators on the matter disagreed about whether 
legalization was an affirmative authorization that could be preempted 
by Congress.52 
State marijuana legalization efforts, however, often operate by 
repealing existing anti-marijuana laws.53 By restoring “the state of 
nature that existed until the early 1900s when marijuana bans were 
first adopted,” states can adopt the same approach New Jersey used 
when it repealed New Jersey’s anti-gambling laws.54 In Murphy, the 
Court concluded that Congress could not prohibit state governments 
from making such a choice, presumptively authorizing states to 
legalize marijuana in this fashion.55 
While there is no question that federal marijuana law can preempt 
state legalization efforts in some respects,56 Murphy dictates that 
federal jurisdiction over marijuana use can extend only as far as the 
federal resources allotted to enforce it. As more states legalize 
marijuana, whether directly or by repealing existing laws, the federal 
government’s preemptive anti-marijuana laws appear increasingly 
impractical. 
B.  Immigration 
Murphy’s prohibition on “authorizing” gambling may also have 
profound consequences for the current legal skirmish being fought 
over sanctuary cities. “Most ‘sanctuary’ policies are directions by state 
and local governments to their own officials, ordering them not to do 
certain things—turn over information about immigration and release 
status, for example, or hold prisoners not charged with crimes solely 
for the convenience of federal immigration authorities.”57 Recently, 
 
 51. See Brianne J. Gorod, Marijuana Legalization and Horizontal Federalism, 50 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 595, 601 (2016). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ 
Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1453 (2009). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018). 
 56. Erwin Chemerinsky et. al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA 
L. REV. 74, 103 (2015). 
 57. Garrett Epps, The Supreme Court Says Congress Can’t Make States Dance to Its Tune, 
ATLANTIC (May 14, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/05/paspa-
sanctuary-cities/560369/. 
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the Trump administration has claimed that these policies violate 8 
U.S.C. § 1373(a),58 which provides in relevant part: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or 
local law, a Federal, State, or local government entity or 
official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any 
government entity or official from sending to, or receiving 
from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, 
lawful or unlawful, of any individual.59 
By “prohibit[ing]” and “restrict[ing]” government entities from 
not enforcing federal immigration policies however, section 1373(a) 
makes the type of negative command to state governments deemed 
unconstitutional in Murphy.60 A recent district court opinion, coming 
only two months after Murphy, made this very observation. 
In United States v. California,61 a federal district court in the 
Eastern District of California considered the constitutionality of 
section 1373(a) to be “highly suspect,” holding “that a Congressional 
mandate prohibiting states from restricting their law enforcement 
agencies’ involvement in immigration enforcement activities—apart 
from, perhaps, a narrowly drawn information sharing provision—
would likely violate the Tenth Amendment.”62 The court found 
Murphy supportive of its conclusion, citing Murphy for the proposition 
that “a prohibition on state legislation violates the anticommandeering 
rule.”63 
While Murphy may have empowered left-leaning states to adopt 
liberal marijuana and immigration policies to the chagrin of President 
Trump’s administration, these progressive outcomes are likely to 
prove anomalous. Because principles of federalism are usually 
invoked to produce conservative outcomes,64 Murphy will likely mark 
a decisive victory for the right wing. The Court’s increasing 
 
 58. Experts Elucidate Trump Executive Order Targeting “Sanctuary Cities”, N.Y.U. L.  
(Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.law.nyu.edu/news/experts-trump-executive-order-immigration-
targeting-sanctuary-cities. 
 59. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2012). 
 60. Epps, supra note 57. 
 61. 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077 (E.D. Cal. 2018). 
 62. Id. at 1101, 1109. 
 63. Id. at 1109 (citing Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018)). 
 64. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, The Three Faces of Federalism: An Empirical 
Assessment of Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 741 (2000). 
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willingness to cut away at the federal government’s power and 
potentially interfere with future, progressive legislation can also be 
observed in the Murphy Court’s severability analysis. 
VI.  THE SEVERABILITY DOCTRINE 
When part of a law is deemed unconstitutional, the severability 
doctrine determines whether other, constitutionally valid parts of the 
law remain in effect.65 Before Murphy, multifaceted laws were only 
struck in their entirety when it was “evident that [Congress] would not 
have enacted those provisions which [were] within its power, 
independently of [those] which [were] not.”66 Severability was thus 
presumed unless evidence of contrary legislative intent was 
compelling enough to overcome this presumption.67 
In discerning legislative intent, courts have considered a broad 
spectrum of evidence, ranging from statutory phrasing and structure 
to more nebulous interpretations of a statute’s purpose.68 The Supreme 
Court has almost always made an effort to tether its severability 
analyses to these types of evidence.69 
By refusing to sever subsection (2) from subsection (1) without 
meaningful evidence of Congress’s theoretical approval, the Court 
departed from this precedent in Murphy. 
A.  Severability in Murphy 
1.  The Majority Opinion 
The Murphy Court decided that the somewhat unintuitive results 
of severing the two PASPA subsections would have deterred Congress 
from passing subsection (2) in isolation.70 First, the Court reasoned 
that Congress would not have wanted to legalize sports gambling in 
private casinos while simultaneously prohibiting state-run sports 
 
 65. Brian C. Lea, Situational Severability, 103 VA. L. REV. 735, 737 (2017). 
 66. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1482 (2018) (alterations in original) (quoting Alaska 
Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987)). 
 67. See id. at 1489–90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 68. Lea, supra note 65, at 746–47. 
 69. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telcomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 810 
(1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The congressional findings in the 
statute and the conclusions of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
after more than two years of hearings on the cable market are instructive.”); Alaska Airlines, Inc., 
480 U.S. at 691–96 (analyzing Senate reports). 
 70. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1482–83 (majority opinion). 
(7) 52.2_BALLARD (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2019  1:33 AM 
2018] MURPHY V. NCAA AND FEDERALISM 183 
lotteries.71 Because private gambling is considered more pernicious to 
society than state-operated lotteries, legalizing sports gambling in 
casinos while prohibiting state-sponsored sports lotteries seemed to 
the Court, “exactly backwards.”72 
Second, the Court addressed the supposedly incoherent results of 
enforcing subsection (2) on its own. Under subsection (2), private 
sports gambling would have been illegal if state law made it legal.73 
Conversely, if state law did make private sports gambling illegal, 
subsection (2) would not have applied.74 
The Court characterized this functional quirk as “perverse,” as it 
undermined “whatever policy is favored by the people of a State.”75 
The Court intuited that Congress would not have endorsed this “weird 
result.”76 
2.  The Breyer Concurrence 
While Justice Breyer agreed that subsection (1) was 
unconstitutional, in his concurrence, he took issue with the majority’s 
characterization of Congress’s legislative intent. Contrary to the 
majority’s presumptions, Justice Breyer contended that the “weird” 
manner in which subsection (2) operated could have been 
intentional.77 Justice Breyer argued that Congress may have wanted 
subsection (2) to apply only when state law would not otherwise have 
made sports gambling illegal because Congress “may have preferred 
that state authorities enforce state law forbidding sports gambling than 
require federal authorities to bring civil suits to enforce federal law 
forbidding about the same thing.78 Alternatively, Justice Breyer 
contended that Congress may have included subsection (2) as a 
constitutional “backup” if subsection (1) was deemed 
unconstitutional, specifically contemplating the issue at bar.79 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1483. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1484. 
 77. Id. at 1488 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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3.  The Ginsburg Dissent 
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg focused almost all of her attention 
on her vehement disagreement with the Court’s decision not to sever 
subsection (2),80 accusing the Court of “wield[ing] an ax to cut 
down” the subsection “instead of using a scalpel.”81 Justice Ginsburg 
argued that even if subsection (1) was unconstitutional (a point she 
refused to concede), the severability doctrine should have preserved 
its constitutionally sound counterpart.82 
Ginsburg found the majority’s characterization of the legislative 
intent meritless.83 “On no rational ground,” Ginsburg contended, 
“[could] it be concluded that Congress would have preferred no statute 
at all if it could not prohibit States from authorizing or licensing such 
schemes.”84 
B.  Murphy Departs from Severability Precedent 
When the Court characterized Congress’s hypothetical 
preferences in its severability analyses, it failed to cite any meaningful 
evidence indicating Congress would have thought alike. Tellingly, the 
Court cited a Senate report only once, referencing a Congressional 
Budget Office estimate that calculated the price of enforcing PASPA 
as a whole.85 The Court suggested that this report indicated that 
Congress would never have wanted PASPA enforced piecemeal.86 
This suggestion is illogical. 
While the estimate undeniably calculated the cost of PASPA as a 
whole, it did not shed light on Congress’s hypothetical intent had 
Congress known PASPA was enforceable only in part. The estimate’s 
contemplation of one particular scenario, total enforcement, cannot be 
logically interpreted as evidence that Congress wished to foreclose all 
other possible enforcement scenarios. Despite the Court’s token use of 
documentary evidence, the conclusion that Congress would have 
disfavored preserving subsection (2) remained completely 
unsubstantiated.87 
 
 80. Id. at 1488–90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 81. Id. at 1490. 
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 85. Id. at 1484 (majority opinion). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1490. 
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In fact, the available evidence supports the opposite conclusion. 
The Senate reports reflect Congress’s unqualified desire to discourage 
sports gambling, irrespective of whether its means of doing so were 
ultimately weakened or made “weird” by judicial review.88 Despite 
the intuitive meaning of the evidence and the compelling 
counterarguments levied by the dissenting Justices, the Court elected 
to fabricate its own rationale for declining severability, couching its 
most significant analysis in counterfactual supposition. By doing so, 
the Court ignored the presumption of severability and judicial restraint 
that had previously defined severability precedent. 
C.  The Political Ramifications of Murphy Severability Analysis 
The Murphy Court’s increased willingness to decline severability 
has significant political consequences. Some of the most historic 
liberal legislation passed in the last century has survived judicial 
review only because the Court was willing to apply the severability 
doctrine.89 For example, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act survived judicial review in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius90 only because five out of nine Justices were 
willing to preserve what remained of the act after the majority struck 
its Medicaid expansion provision for being unconstitutional.91 After 
Murphy, liberal legislators will be wary of the Court’s more 
threatening severability standard when drafting similarly 
comprehensive legislation. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
By augmenting the anticommandeering doctrine and by relaxing 
the evidentiary standard for declining severability, Murphy made clear 
that challenged federal statutes that conflict with federalist tenets, even 
if only in part, will likely be stricken in their entirety. Should the 
Court’s decidedly conservative majority outlast the Republicans’ 
control of Congress, the anticommandeering doctrine, in combination 
with this new severability standard, could very well frustrate future 
 
 88. See S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 4–7 (1991) (“The purpose of S. 474 is to prohibit sports 
gambling conducted by, or authorized under the law of, any State or other governmental entity.”). 
 89. See Lea, supra note 65, at 737–38 (2017) (“[S]everability doctrine has determined the fates 
of many landmark laws, including the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, the Federal Election 
Campaign Act . . . and the Social Security Act.”). 
 90. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
 91. Id. at 586–87; Lea, supra note 65, at 737. 
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liberal legislation. Given that Justice Kavanaugh, a staunch 
conservative92 and federalist93 in his own right, has recently been 
appointed to the Supreme Court, this era of Supreme Court federalism 
is likely to last into the foreseeable future. 
 
 
 92. See Alvin Chang, Brett Kavanaugh and the Supreme Court’s Drastic Shift to the Right, 
Cartoonsplained, VOX, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/7/9/17537808/supreme-
court-brett-kavanaugh-right-cartoon (last updated Sept. 14, 2018). 
 93. Jess Bravin & Brent Kendall, Brett Kavanaugh’s Record Shows Push to Restrain the 
Regulatory State, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 31, 2018, 1:43 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/brett-
kavanaughs-record-shows-push-to-restrain-the-regulatory-state-1535737394. 
